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 If we are to act ethically…we must avow error as constitutive of who we are. 
 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself 
 
 
The work of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory – and particularly 
the individual and collaborative efforts of Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
W. Adorno, who formed its center over more than three decades – 
shows such diversity of method and focus that many of its most sig-
nificant scholars and critics apply to it the term “interdisciplinary” with 
substantial justification and without irony (Benhabib, Bonss, and 
McCole 1993). Horkheimer and Adorno would doubtless have been 
gratified at this stream of reception of their work, for they indeed 
sought and developed an embedded critique of the inherent problems 
of the control and instrumentalization of knowledge through academic 
and scientific discipline from the inception of the concept of Critical 
Theory itself in the mid-1930s. Nonetheless this interdisciplinarity 
sometimes took such heterodox form that readers and scholars cannot 
help but come to contradictory conclusions about the theories and ar-
guments propagated by the many members of the school. These fric-
tions in the school’s reception are further exacerbated by the ongoing 
– and sometimes increasing – disciplinary divisions that separate the 
fields with the greatest interest in the Frankfurt School’s work: sociol-
ogy, philosophy, cultural and literary studies, and musicology. Fur-
thermore, the established historical and critical narratives of the 
school’s development, written by scholars including Martin Jay, Susan 
Buck-Morss, and Rolf Wiggershaus, have provided generations of 
scholars with such a thorough introduction to the school’s work that 
they have reached the level of orthodoxy. Thus as rich as the Frankfurt 
School’s legacy remains for scholars and critics in numerous fields, 
new work on it must navigate carefully around these many disciplinary 
investments, established orthodoxies, and standing controversies. 
 A growing stream of recent work in sociology and cultural studies 
has attempted to make sense of a particularly troublesome sphere of 
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the Frankfurt School’s interest: its approach to the multifarious social 
and psychological aspects of sexuality. Sexuality complicates the his-
torical and intellectual legacy of the school for many reasons. Some of 
the work of several early and important members certainly takes 
sexuality as its main critical focus. These members, however, were not 
the inner circle (Horkheimer and Adorno), but rather (in the 1930s and 
1940s) Erich Fromm and (in the 1940s and later) Herbert Marcuse, 
both of whom came into conflict with Horkheimer and Adorno for the 
potentially redemptive aspects of their analyses of the erotics of cul-
ture and society (Halle 1995; Dannecker 1997; Wheatland 2004; 
Worrell 2006). These conflicts sometimes leave readers with a sense 
that Horkheimer and Adorno could be curiously prudish, despite the 
fact that one need not do more than scratch the surface of their work 
to discover extensive reflection on sex and sexuality. Some of their 
own close colleagues feared even that they might be seen as liber-
tines: Leo Lowenthal’s first reaction to the manuscript of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (DoE) in 1944 was that it “may create the impression 
that the program of free love is proclaimed” (Quoted in Schmidt 2007: 
58). The second excursus in DoE, which analyzes the writings of the 
Marquis de Sade, is of course only the most proximate cause of such 
concerns (an issue trenchantly explored in Comay 2006). Nonetheless 
recent scholarship that reevaluates the influence of Freudian psycho-
analysis on Horkheimer and Adorno reinforces the sense that their phi-
losophically generated abstraction of libidinal and erotic drives casts 
attention away from the diverse lives of individuals in the service of 
theoretical totalization (Halle 1995). Their choice to maintain a high-
bourgeois style of dress and domestic life and thereby to reject prole-
tarian or radical trappings, heightened the sense of some critics (espe-
cially in the later 1960s) that too much deployment of authority lay 
behind their critique of the authoritarian. The infamous “bared-breasts 
incident” in Adorno’s lecture hall in Frankfurt in 1968 (recently reread 
brilliantly in Lee 2006) has long been the central symbolic moment of 
this tension. 
 It is in the inner circle’s interpretation and representation of ho-
mosexuality that their residual prudishness seems most dramatically 
displayed. The few places in their work where they directly address the 
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concept “homosexuality” indeed do read almost hair-raisingly, which 
has occasioned reasoned critique in recent scholarship (Halle 1995; 
Rycenga 2002). DoE contains the concept four times (though Halle and 
Rycenga miss the later two). The first two sit in close proximity in the 
sixth section of the “Elements of Antisemitism,” where a circuitous ar-
gument links “homosexual aggression” to antisemitic violence. The 
first statement is surprisingly direct, and found in a sentence that must 
rank among the very shortest in DoE: “The forbidden thing transmuted 
into aggression is mostly of homosexual character” (Adorno and Hork-
heimer 1988: 201).1 This argument is glossed further with specific – 
and typically biologically-inflected – reference to Freud’s theorization 
of projection as the correlative of the weakness of defense mecha-
nisms oriented toward repressed elements of the ego: “under the 
pressure of dammed-up homosexual aggression the psyche’s mecha-
nism forgets its most recent phylogenetic achievement, self-
awareness, and experiences that aggression as the enemy in the 
world, the better to be able to confront it” (Adorno and Horkheimer 
1988: 202). A first reading of this passage indeed raises the concern, 
as Halle and Rycenga emphasize, that Horkheimer and Adorno inter-
pret homosexuality entirely through Freudian categories. And one need 
not dig deep in the extensive documents of the inner circle’s activity in 
the 1940s to find evidence that Horkheimer, at least, chose to stick to 
Freudian orthodoxy rather than accept Fromm’s views (Jay 1996; 
Dannecker 1997). This problem in fact seems redoubled in the second 
passage, for there seems to be no homosexuality without repressed 
Oedipal aggression. 
 The remaining two references to homosexuality in DoE are found 
in the final passage of the work, the extended and heterodox series of 
fragmentary “Notes and Sketches” that represent the authors’ attempt 
to begin to construct an “anthropology” – that typically German variety 
of philosophical reflection on the characteristics and typology of the 
human that has little to do with the Anglo-American academic disci-
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated in the references, all translations are by the author. 
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pline that appropriated the moniker (Schmidt 1998). Remarkably, the 
two longest of these fragments contain reflections on homosexuality, 
and both make even more overt the links that Horkheimer and Adorno 
posit between repressed homosexuality and fascism. The title of the 
first and longest, “Human and Animal,” points directly at its German 
anthropological spirit. The other is a remarkable text called “Interest in 
the Body.”  Both have drawn notice in the growing literature on sex, 
sexuality, and gender in the Frankfurt School, but not for the deploy-
ment of the concept of homosexuality in them (Franks 2006: 205; Lee 
2006: 116). Perhaps the most eye-popping statement about homo-
sexuality in all of Critical Theory is the one in “Human and Animal,” 
which is suffused with gendered and politically charged language diffi-
cult to render in English: “He [Mann] becomes woman [Weib], who 
looks upon domination [Herrschaft]. Everyone in the fascist collective, 
with its teams and work camps, is from tender youth on a prisoner in 
solitary confinement; it breeds homosexuality” (Adorno and Hork-
heimer 1988: 269). The passage on homosexuality in “Interest in the 
Body” reverses the focus, concentrating not on the power of fascism 
but on the ways it embraces and transfigures the repressions and re-
sentments of its own victims. In the bleak intellectual ocean of DoE, 
with its breaking waves that seem to scour the veneer of liberation 
from all human motivation to reveal a violent and dominating core, 
this passage towers high. In it, the powerless, resentful, and manipu-
lated lower members of a dominating society – victims or collaborators 
as they may be – are necessarily homosexual and paranoid: “Such 
enmity of the lowest for their own withered life, to which these homo-
sexual and paranoid people themselves relate through murderous as-
sault – this enmity, so carefully raised and nourished by the temporal 
and spiritual higher-ups, was always an indispensible instrument of the 
art of government” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1988: 249). 
 Halle, Dannecker, and Rycenga have analyzed the few other 
passages of similar import in Adorno’s work in the decades after the 
publication of DoE. The most interesting of them, “Sexual Taboos and 
the Law Today,” was written for a collection of essays on sexuality and 
crime published in 1963. After a lengthy exploration of the Freudian 
theory of genital sexuality as an integrated stage of development sub-
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sequent to earlier, partial stages, Adorno argues that sexual taboos in 
late capitalist society take the form of prejudices that exclude anything 
but the genital from the sphere of the sexual (Adorno 1977: 537-540). 
He subjects several legally proscribed but discursively common 
spheres of sexual practice to his Freudian-dialectical mode of analysis. 
These include prostitution, sexual issues surrounding minors, and ho-
mosexuality. He concludes with a set of nine suggestions for empirical 
social research on the justification and consequences of the legal pro-
scription of sexual behaviors, and proposes that the “F-Scale” devel-
oped in The Authoritarian Personality (1950) to quantify fascist ten-
dencies could provide a model for an ordering of sexually ‘criminal’ 
personality types (Adorno 1977: 551). 
 The analysis of homosexuality in “Sexual Taboos and the Law 
Today” is the shortest of the three analyses of particular forms of pro-
scribed sexual behavior, filling only one page-long paragraph. It is also 
remarkably undialectical in character (though plenty of readers might 
welcome more such respite from apparently gratuitous complexity in 
Adorno’s work). There is plenty of Adorno’s trademark irony, of 
course, but his condemnation of the retention of the notorious para-
graph 175 of the German penal code in postwar West German law is 
straightforward. He begins: “The abhorrent paragraph about homo-
sexuals has been rescued for liberated Germany.”  The rest of the pas-
sage, as Halle and Rycenga note, is remarkably retrograde, and almost 
a museum of nineteenth-century arguments about the etiology and 
cultural position of homosexuality. It discusses blackmail, the Freudian 
theory of unresolved Oedipal conflict in homosexuality, and even the 
“intellectual talents” of homosexuals, which he sees as potentially 
damaged and lost to society because homosexuals must live in fear of 
prosecution (Adorno 1977: 543-544). Nonetheless this set of antique 
arguments has a dialectical introduction, a single sentence that com-
pletes the paragraph prior to it. And this sentence, while leaving fas-
cism unmentioned, again links homosexuality and dominating intent in 
ways familiar from DoE. It concludes Adorno’s argument that in bour-
geois society, taboos often have the function of causing those people 
most disadvantaged by them to internalize and recapitulate repression 
by redirecting it outward toward others – the Freudian mechanism of 
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projection. Adorno’s crowning example: “homosexuals among whom 
the enthusiasm for virility couples with that for well-bred order [Zucht 
und Ordnung], and together with the ideology of the noble body 
stands ready for the persecution of other minorities like intellectuals” 
(Adorno 1977: 543). Adorno’s dialectical silence about Nazism runs the 
danger of deafening the reader in this sentence, and gives everything 
in the following discussion of homosexuality a throwaway character. If 
anything, the atypical undialectical flatness of that subsequent discus-
sion represents Adorno’s mode of talking down to an audience whose 
level of philosophical sophistication could not be assured. 
 What then, if anything beyond a cautionary tale of scholarly 
meta-prejudice (an argument pursued in Schlipphacke 2001), can be 
retrieved from Horkheimer and Adorno’s approach to homosexuality, 
given that it recurrently and repetitively discusses homosexuality pri-
marily if not only in the context of arguments about domination and 
fascism?  Many equivocal rationalizations are possible. First, especially 
in DoE, the negativity of the presentation of all of the social phenom-
ena of bourgeois society under late capitalism is absolute. Everything 
is dissected in search of its residues of domination. Second, it is often 
in the behavior of self-appointed ‘progressives’ or ‘liberators’ that 
Horkheimer and Adorno detect particularly noxious – if unconscious – 
residues of domination. Such skepticism bears more specific fruit in 
works like Horkheimer’s essay on “Traditional and Critical Theory” 
(1937) and his book Eclipse of Reason (1947), as well as Adorno’s es-
says like “Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America” 
(1968/1969), which contain substantially more direct reflection on so-
cial and scholarly practice than does the rigorously theoretical and phi-
losophical DoE. Third, Horkheimer and Adorno owe more to biological 
and medical discourses of pathology and deviance than the traditional 
historical and critical narratives of the development of their work have 
allowed (Amidon 2008). Homosexuality was broadly if not universally 
recognized as pathological in the early twentieth century. Even some 
of the great crusaders for homosexual rights like Magnus Hirschfeld 
argued that homosexuality was exclusively a biological and medical 
concern, rather than a legal one, and if homosexual inclinations were 
not inherently pathological, some manifestations of them were (Bul-
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lough 1994: 61-75; Amidon 2008a). Horkheimer and Adorno, despite 
their nuanced and lively critique of scientific and medical disciplinarity, 
did not give up scholarly knowledge production as a goal (if not the 
goal) of their practice, and they accepted remarkably uncritically the 
evaluation of homosexuality as pathological. 
 None of these rationalizations is remotely satisfactory, however. 
Halle and Rycenga have shown how other scholars with methods and 
goals congruent with Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s – meaning containing 
embedded dialectical critique – have pointed the way out of what ap-
pears to be the trap of their approach to homosexuality. Halle finds a 
historically embedded potential in Herbert Marcuse’s essay “On Hedon-
ism,” published in Horkheimer’s Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in 1936. 
Rycenga finds it in Raya Dunayevskaya’s arguments about revolution. 
Neither, however, seeks in the structures and trajectories of Hork-
heimer’s and Adorno’s methods – and in the other branches of their 
work that address culture and the arts – a fuller explanation of what 
appears to be a moment of critical failure in their arguments about 
homosexuality. 
 Recent feminist scholarship, which has provided numerous ave-
nues for reviving the vigor of Critical Theory and its legacy, has 
pointed to the potential development of a reading of Horkheimer and 
Adorno that contributes both to a revival of Critical Theory’s contribu-
tion to scholarship and ethics under (post-) modern conditions and to 
an adequate reading of the blind spots and inadequacies in the work of 
Critical Theory’s founders. Only work that does both can in fact earn 
the name ‘critical’ for itself, and this new feminist scholarship, found in 
two superb recent essay collections, both published in 2006, does so. 
The first is a special issue of the journal differences; the second is a 
volume in the vigorous Penn State University Press book series on “Re-
Reading the Canon” (Brown 2006; Heberle 2006). Despite ongoing in-
terest, feminism has in fact had trouble approaching Critical Theory, 
often precisely because its forbidding negativity seems unremediable 
for interventions in social praxis (Schlipphacke 2001; Rycenga 2002; 
Hewitt 2006; Lee 2006). But when feminism embeds its own critique 
of such intervention, it embeds Critical Theory. Heberle explains: 
“Adorno’s work may have unintended (by him) consequences for femi-
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nism that can only be discerned through open-ended and experimental 
approaches to his work, which is open and experimental in its own 
right” (Heberle 2006a: 3). Brown makes a similar and even stronger 
argument: “Critical Theory is thus a model both for the complexity and 
self-reflexivity feminist theory requires and also offers elegant insights 
for contemporary work” (Brown 2006a: 5). Their arguments indeed 
point the way toward an adequate contextualization of the problems in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s approach to homosexuality. 
 In 2002, the University of Frankfurt invited Judith Butler to give 
the inaugural set of an ongoing series of lectures by major thinkers 
named in honor of Theodor Adorno. In 2005 these lectures appeared 
in English under the title Giving an Account of Oneself, and have con-
tributed new energy both to Adorno scholarship in general and particu-
larly to work that focuses on Adorno’s ethics (Butler 2005). Several of 
the contributors to the Heberle and Brown essay collections see But-
ler’s arguments as providing a new basis for reengaging feminism with 
Critical Theory. Her ideas can further provide the grounding for a clear 
understanding of Horkheimer and Adorno’s claims about homosexual-
ity. The key moment comes through careful attention to the rigorously 
recursive relationship of the individual and the social in their work. In 
their negatively valenced Critical Theory, any hypostasized claim about 
either society or the individual is immediately suspect. All psychology 
is sociology and vice versa. All philosophy is social science and vice 
versa. Butler configures her own language in this spirit. The three 
chapter headings of Giving an Account of Oneself represent this mo-
ment of the derivation of social content from ethical reflection: from 
the individual (“An Account of Oneself”), to the power relations of the 
socially active individual (“Against Ethical Violence”), to a concept that 
inheres recursively ethical intersubjectivity in a social world (“Respon-
sibility”). The center of the chapter on “Responsibility” contains But-
ler’s reading of Adorno’s ethics, derived primarily from lectures he 
gave in 1963 and published under the title Problems of Moral Philoso-
phy. Immediately she focuses on recursion, pushing the individual in 
the direction of the social, placing herself and her reader within an im-
plied sphere of ethical social practice through the use of the plural 
first-person pronoun: “If the human is anything, it seems to be a dou-
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ble movement, one in which we assert moral norms at the same time 
as we question the authority by which we make that assertion” (Butler 
2005: 103). She resolves her argument into a highly positive reading 
of Adorno’s ethical thought: “it is a model of ethical capaciousness, 
which understands the pull of the claim and resists that pull at the 
same time, providing a certain ambivalent gesture as the action of 
ethics itself” (Butler 2005: 103). Finally, she concludes that the idea of 
the autonomous ethical subject, despite its troubled history, cannot 
and must not be allowed to wither completely: 
This is not the death of the subject…but an inquiry into the 
modes by which the subject is instituted and maintained, how it 
institutes and maintains itself, and how the norms that govern 
ethical principles must be understood not only to guide conduct 
but to decide the question of who and what will be a human sub-
ject (Butler 2005: 110). 
 
Thus Butler returns to the crucial moment in Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
thought which itself generates their troubled reading of homosexuality: 
all ethics that take individuals seriously contain exclusionary potential. 
Butler’s argument brings Adorno’s thought closely into contact with 
that of Michel Foucault, who also pursues the potentially exclusionary 
power discourses of enlightened knowledge production, and therefore 
also requires attention to the historicity of ethical processes. And it is 
through the historical trajectory of the concept of homosexuality that 
Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s blind spots can be brought into focus and 
resolved into critical insight. 
 Same-sex-oriented sexual behavior is, of course, observable in 
human history from the inception of the documentary tradition, and 
inferable in prehistory through other anthropological and archaeologi-
cal methods. The scholarly literature that explores the complexities of 
the documentary tradition and how to read and analyze it to reveal the 
often-proscribed forms of same-sex-oriented sexual behavior has 
grown extensive and fascinating recently (Foucault [1978] 1990; Bos-
well 1980; Woods 1998; Fone 2000; Halperin 2002; Crompton 2003). 
A key portion of this literature, however, insists appropriately that de-
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spite the increasingly well-documented historical and cultural ubiquity 
of same-sex sexual behavior, the concept ‘homosexuality’ is an inven-
tion of the nineteenth century, derived largely from legal, medical, bio-
logical, and psychiatric interest (Greenberg 1988; Bland and Doan 
1990; Halperin 1990; Oosterhuis 2000). ‘Homosexuality’ as a concept 
– and therefore in many ways as a subject or identity position taken 
by individuals to represent themselves – therefore contains the new 
and often repressive moments of the legal, medical, and psychiatric 
definition (and sometimes condemnation) of deviance, but at the same 
time a new kind of definition of the self based on sexuality that seems 
to promise liberation from repressive social and cultural norms. Fou-
cault famously called this compelling but often counterintuitive modern 
process of the co-determination of repression and liberation through 
conceptualization the “putting into discourse of sex” (Foucault 1990: 
12). 
 Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s negativity toward the concept of ho-
mosexuality derives from this historical process of the discursive code-
termination of repression and liberation by a scholarly concept. Critical 
Theory as idea and ideal, defined originally by Horkheimer in his “Tra-
ditional and Critical Theory” (1937), seeks as the fundamental moment 
of its method a critique of the social function of the scholarly-
philosophical concept (Horkheimer 1970a: 39-46). In order to formu-
late his statement of the content of Critical Theory, however, Hork-
heimer drew on his own work from the year before about the status 
and freedom of the bourgeois individual in society. This essay, entitled 
“Egoism and the Freedom Movement: On the Anthropology of the 
Bourgeois Era” (1936) argues that the bourgeois concept of self-
fulfillment through the exercise of personal freedom (i.e. egoism) is 
the dialectical twin of the concept of unfettered and destructive capi-
talist competition of all bourgeois individuals with all others – and that 
moral thought in both its Kantian and utilitarian forms collaborates in 
this making-equivalent of personal freedom and competitive exploita-
tion. The issue of sexuality enters in Horkheimer’s reading of repres-
sive proto-bourgeois moralists like Savonarola, Luther, Calvin, and 
Robespierre, as well as in Horkheimer’s deployment of Freud’s read-
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ings of the friction between culture and ego-driven competitiveness 
(Horkheimer 1970b: 120-132, 155-156). 
The fuller form of the exploration of the moment of sexuality in 
Critical Theory arrives in DoE, particularly in the two “excurses” that in 
fact form the core of the work’s analysis of cultural objects as the 
grounds of philosophical understanding. The first of these excurses ex-
plores Homer’s Odyssey, a work that culminates in Odysseus’s rees-
tablishment of the sexual order of the society of Ithaka through his 
and his son Telemachos’s slaughter of the many dozens of freeloading 
suitors of his wife Penelope. The second excursus analyzes the works 
of the Marquis de Sade, and concludes, deploying Kant’s classical defi-
nition of the enlightened subject, that “the work of the Marquis de 
Sade shows ‘understanding without control by another,’ that is the 
bourgeois subject freed from guardianship” (Adorno and Horkheimer 
1988: 93). For the Horkheimer and Adorno of DoE, “free” sexuality 
cannot be anything of the sort, because it is only conceivable as taking 
place between participants in the bourgeois moral-economic system of 
the inexorable exploitation of all people by all people all of the time. 
For them, then, the concept homosexuality – historically invented both 
to defend and to condemn same-sex sexual behavior – cannot be any-
thing but a constitutive part of this system of the recursive generation 
of domination. 
Adorno and Horkheimer therefore only use the term homosexu-
ality to refer to a kind of social pathology, because their critique of 
bourgeois society reveals – almost avant la lettre - that the term is de-
rived from a nineteenth-century construction based on arguments 
about pathology and deviance. In their understanding homosexuality 
reveals a great deal about the repressive and dominating deployment 
of Enlightenment science and medicine, but almost nothing about its 
liberating spheres of rights, subjectivities, and expressions. Therefore 
the case-study scholarship and highly personal advocacy of many of 
the early German researchers and commentators on homosexuality, 
from Karl Heinrich Ulrichs and Károly Kertbeny to Johann Ludwig Cas-
per, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, and Magnus Hirschfeld, does not reach 
the level of generality about the human, the social, and the conceptual 
that Horkheimer and Adorno’s theoretical investments seem to de-
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mand, and are never mentioned in their work. It is not the diverse 
sexual behavior of individuals that makes them squirm (and Hork-
heimer and Adorno would doubtless have loathed the concept of “sex-
ual expression” for its unexamined conflation of behavioral and aes-
thetic categories). It is rather the ways in which the social and sym-
bolic function and interpretation of that behavior often reveals poten-
tial or real violence, domination, and exploitation. They are also – 
sometimes to a fault – never afraid to seek the dominating elements in 
the motivations of those who would declare their own behavior 
enlightened, liberated, or radical. Critics like Axel Honneth (himself a 
successor to Horkheimer and Adorno in Frankfurt) have seen this as 
evidence of a “sociological deficit,” but it might better be described as 
an almost-too-radical dialectical critique – and thereby retention 
through refiguration – of conceptual totalization that takes ironical and 
dialectical revenge on its own advocates (Honneth 1991: 17; Jay 
1984). 
The most troubling aspect of Horkheimer and Adorno’s nega-
tively dialectical deployment of the concept of homosexuality is that it 
makes no attempt to account for the diversity of individual human be-
ings and their practices. Butler explores how and where, in his ethi-
cally-oriented work, Adorno in fact developed a vigorous critique of 
false universality as “violence” perpetrated on the individual (Butler 
2005: 4-7). Nonetheless this spirit seems entirely absent in his and 
Horkheimer’s approach to homosexuality, and it thus appears here 
that their attempt to develop a philosophically grounded theory of so-
ciety that links the anthropological (in the German sense of the con-
ceptual analysis of the human) with the cultural (in the German sense 
of the products of human effort in both the artistic and the economic 
spheres) homogenizes the individual. Thus they slide easily into the 
appearance of ignoring – or even backhandedly denigrating – the con-
cerns of homosexual persons subject to the legal and psychiatric disci-
plinary regimes of their day. This blind spot represents a moment 
where their dialectical method abruptly stands still – a potential which 
became central to the inquiry and method of their colleague Walter 
Benjamin, whose own later work seeks the discrete almost radically. 
Adorno had vigorous debates with Benjamin about this issue in the 
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1930s (Wiggershaus 1994: 210-218; Presner 2007: 16-19). The real-
ity of social domination and conflict has vanished entirely into an end-
less sequence of dialectical recursions. That Adorno was aware of the 
possibility of this failure, and therefore of the absurdity of the idea that 
he might need to be absolved of it – a point Butler emphasizes – none-
theless does not cause it to disappear. 
 There is, however, a moment where Adorno’s astringent theo-
retical rigor does develop an almost disorientingly positive interpreta-
tion of the work of a particular artist – and particularly of one of his 
works in which the representation of a homosexual person resolves 
into the possibility of humanity at the level of discrete relationships. 
That artist is Alban Berg, Adorno’s teacher of musical composition. The 
work is Berg’s final, unfinished opera, Lulu. Adorno wrote extensively 
about both, and explored with subtlety and care the many issues of 
sexuality surrounding both Berg as a person and his opera. Nonethe-
less these readings again show Adorno’s fluctuating reticence to ap-
proach matters which take him from the level of the conceptual to that 
of individual human beings, and therefore might raise the specter of 
the deviant. In the midst of his most subtle and sympathetic forms of 
critical argument, his blind spot remains. 
 Berg based his Lulu on a pair of plays by the German playwright 
Frank Wedekind, Earth Spirit (Der Erdgeist, 1895) and Pandora’s Box 
(Die Büchse der Pandora, 1902). Highly controversial in the first dec-
ades of the twentieth century, the plays narrate a series of the con-
summated and unconsummated sexual liaisons of Lulu. The final of 
these is an unconsummated lesbian affair with Countess Geschwitz. All 
lead to murder or suicide. Lulu herself – in the company of Geschwitz 
– falls victim to Jack the Ripper at the end of the plays and the opera. 
Berg had known Wedekind’s plays as early as 1904, and remained fas-
cinated with them for his entire life. He began adapting them for the 
text of his opera in 1928, and by the time of his death in 1935 had 
completed two of the opera’s three acts, a five-part suite of orchestral 
excerpts from the opera, and the text, musical sketch, fragments of 
the orchestration, and suggestions for the complete instrumentation of 
the third act. From these notes, the Viennese musicologist Friedrich 
Cerha produced a full version of the orchestration of the third act that 
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was published after the death of Berg’s wife Helene in 1976. This 
‘completed’ version is now used regularly in performances of the work 
(Perle 1985: 33-41, 275-277). The incredible and fascinating complex-
ity of the opera makes it impossible to discuss in any detail here. The 
work has drawn the admiration not only of philosophers and musicolo-
gists, but also of opera-going audiences. Rare among modern operas – 
and almost unique among works composed with the rigorous twelve-
tone method of Berg’s teacher Arnold Schoenberg – the work achieves 
regular performances in opera houses around the world. George Perle, 
the most dedicated scholar of Berg’s music, goes so far as to call the 
completed three-act Lulu “among the uniquely significant, uniquely 
original, and supremely important musical creations of our century” 
(Perle 1985: 280). 
 Adorno spent 1925 and 1926 studying with Berg in Vienna, and 
developed a lifelong fondness for his teacher. He wrote a number of 
extensive biographical essays about Berg, and also analyzed Berg’s 
entire small but intense musical output. Much of this work was col-
lected and reworked into a major monograph published in 1968 
(Adorno 1971). It contains a remarkable dialectical formulation that 
reveals Adorno’s conviction that true humanity might indeed keep one 
at a distance from individual human beings. He in fact attributes this 
character to Berg’s music: “No music of our time has been as humane 
as his; that pushes it far away from human beings” (Adorno 1971: 
330; compare Adorno 1991: 5). He then reformulates and expands 
this same argument in praise of Lulu: “Berg’s music hits the pressure 
point at which organized humanity cannot understand a joke, and just 
this point becomes for him a refuge of the humane” (Adorno 1971: 
333; Adorno 1991: 7). The monograph also demonstrates dramatically 
how Adorno’s sensibilities could lead him to limit his own discussion of 
matters of sexuality. The book’s second chapter is a thirty-three page 
biographical “Erinnerung” (reminiscence). It contains much reflection 
on Berg’s personal life and marriage, phrased with some delicacy and 
distance: “The habitual underestimation of the sensual by the German 
spirit was completely alien to Berg…. He handled his own person care-
fully and indifferently at once, like the musical instrument that he was 
to himself” (Adorno 1971: 344; Adorno 1991: 16). 
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These hyper-poetic phrasings have a rather saltier counterpart, 
however. In 1955 Adorno wrote – and did not publish – an essay enti-
tled “To the Memory of Alban Berg” that contained a much more frank 
estimation of Berg’s sexuality and approach to it – including homo-
sexuality. The editor of Adorno’s complete works indicates that Adorno 
stipulated that the reflections not be published in his lifetime or that of 
those mentioned immediately in it. Nonetheless Adorno suggested that 
“after that I would like them to be printed, because I believe that I 
have grasped something about Berg that would otherwise be lost” 
(Tiedemann 1984: 645). Much reworked material from this essay 
found its way into the 1968 Berg monograph, but not the most direct 
material about sex and sexuality. The editors and translators of the 
Berg monograph note this, but do not analyze it (Adorno 1991: 141). 
In his unpublished reflections, Adorno describes Berg’s personal ap-
proach to sex and sexuality with something that approaches wistful-
ness – though Freudian language is, as always, not far away: “Berg’s 
relationship to sexuality: he had a friendly attitude toward everything 
sexual, like one sometimes finds among aristocrats – namely with a 
kind of pride in others and in himself about every successful sexual 
union, as if its affinity for death had been triumphantly put down” 
(Adorno 1984: 490). Clearly, Adorno saw Berg’s sexuality as polymor-
phous, though in this page-long discussion homosexuality does not 
appear. 
In the final passages of the essay, however, homosexuality 
erupts, and again in a curious, unstable, and dialectically overloaded 
way. Adorno’s narrative first co-opts Berg into a sarcastic moment 
edging on homophobia, and then – twenty-two pages after he dis-
cussed Berg’s attitudes toward sex in some detail – raises the possibil-
ity of Berg’s own homosexuality. The first moment comes at the only 
point in Adorno’s writings on Berg where he mentions that Berg’s sis-
ter Smaragda lived openly as a lesbian. He does so snidely, in a pas-
sage that also seems to denigrate Berg’s wife, Helene: 
I would also like to take note of Helene’s brother, Mr. Nahowsky, 
who was homosexual and openly [sic] schizophrenic, but also of 
unforgettable beauty. Smaragda, Berg’s sister, was for her part 
lesbian, and among her girlfriends there was a most unsympa-
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thetic woman named Keller…. Berg and I enjoyed imagining for 
ourselves a marriage between Nahowsky and Smaragda (Adorno 
1984: 507). 
 
This passage may be the exception that proves the rule posited by Ry-
cenga: that Adorno “seems (blissfully?) unaware of lesbian possibili-
ties” (Rycenga 2002: 375). It also does a factual and biographical in-
justice to Berg’s relationship to his sister, whom the composer de-
fended in public and in writing. Recent commentators including Perle 
and Mitchell Morris have explored the relationship between Alban and 
Smaragda Berg (Perle 1985: 39-40; Morris 1995: 361-363). 
Unsurprisingly, Adorno cannot conclude his essay without a di-
rect denial that Berg himself was homosexual despite his interest in 
issues of sexual and gender ambiguity. Again in an eye-popping meta-
dialectical manner, Adorno does so in a passage that emphasizes, in 
stark contrast to other points he makes, Berg’s “inhumanity”: 
 
I possessed, in a certain measure, an organ for that part of him 
that bordered on the inhumane, and which was perhaps related 
to his charm, his female element. He was, moreover, not homo-
sexual, but he passionately believed in Weininger and said once 
that every decent human being most certainly has a female 
component. This moment of inhumanity is to be understood in a 
most emphatic sense, and is certainly not to be separated from 
his relationship to death… (Adorno 1984: 511). 
 
Once again, Adorno’s thought makes homosexuality inseparable from 
death and the inhuman. In this essay he treats the individual sardoni-
cally, as the living site of critique, and does so to cast light upon the 
greater dialectical importance of the conceptual. Berg himself even be-
comes a metaphor for this sublation of the individual into the realm of 
principle: 
 
  
New York Journal of Sociology, 2008, Vol. 1 18 
 
In the ten years that I knew him, I always more or less clearly 
had the feeling that as an empirical human being he was not en-
tirely there, did not really play along; he was the opposite of an 
existential, self-identified human being…. Berg’s entire empirical 
existence stood below the primacy of the work; he fashioned 
himself into an instrument for it… (Adorno 1984: 511). 
 
In the 1968 Berg monograph, this interpretation is phrased strikingly: 
“Psychology transcends itself in Berg’s music” (Adorno 1971: 351). If, 
for Adorno, anything can escape the Enlightenment-domination trap, 
and even perhaps help individuals themselves to do so, it is Berg’s 
music. Unfortunately, his moment of blindness about homosexuality 
remains. Universally in Adorno’s thought, homosexuality as a concept 
excludes the possibility of transcendent and self-transcendent aes-
thetic work from the position of homosexual self-identification. 
Adorno’s interpretation of the relationship between Lulu and 
Geschwitz in Berg’s opera bears the marks of this complex, meta-
dialectical relationship to his teacher’s person, work, and memory. In 
all of Adorno’s extensive writings on Berg, the lesbian relationship be-
tween Lulu and Geschwitz – unconsummated as it may be – is men-
tioned directly only once, in a lecture that Berg delivered to the audi-
ence before the premiere of Lulu in Frankfurt in 1960.2  And once 
again, in almost radical and radically poetic dialectical language, it 
demonstrates the abjection of the individual human characters in the 
opera in the service of the realm of ideas: 
 
At the same time that points to the idea. In the same way that 
the characters in the drama throw themselves away among the 
hopeless and the lost – the compulsive Lulu, Geschwitz in sexual 
thrall to her, Doctor Schön, and Alwa – so too does the opera…. 
                                                 
2 The index to the English translation of the 1968 Berg monograph contains a list of 
references to the characters in Lulu. Geschwitz does not appear (Adorno 1991: 149). 
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It [the work] turns to rescue that which must carry the load of 
universal scorn. That is the origin of its violence-free violence. 
No other music of our time is so humane as that of Berg, and 
people thus recoil from it. The phantasmagoria of grand opera as 
which Lulu will represent itself to you is at the same time the 
model of an artwork of real humanity (Adorno 1984a: 648-649). 
 
Homosexual individuals certainly qualify in Adorno’s thought for con-
ceptual inclusion in the sphere of those subject to universal scorn. But 
he cannot bring himself to grant them, as individuals, any moment of 
humanity. So his dialectics carry on inexorably, both aware and un-
aware at once of the blind spots within. 
The incommensurabilities of the representation of homosexuality 
in Horkheimer and Adorno thus display the dissonance between ethical 
action (derived from and centered on the critical and self-critical sub-
ject, and therefore ‘capacious’ in Butler’s sense, meaning generating 
and requiring intersubjective responsibility and respect) and ethical 
systems (which as a historical and collective phenomenon under mod-
ern conditions embed enough of the repressive content of bourgeois 
enlightenment to be always suspect). Because, for Horkheimer and 
Adorno, homosexuality carries enough historically derived residues of 
pathology that its foundation as a subject position is shaky, and also 
because it has always been a key locus of the generation of bourgeois 
discourses of ethical system-building, homosexual persons fall into a 
gap in Critical Theory – just as they do in Kant’s ethics where they are 
at their most abstract, in the Metaphysics of Morals (Comay 2006: 8). 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, then, homosexuality as a concept is both 
so historically and philosophically labile that it appears untenable as 
grounding for the psychologically integrated critical subjectivity neces-
sary to all ethics. Adorno approaches awareness of this in “Sexual Ta-
boos and the Law Today”: “The question of the freedom of the will is 
probably not at all to be solved abstractly, namely through ideal con-
structions of the individual and his character that exists purely for it-
self, but rather only in consciousness of the dialectics of individual and 
society” (Adorno 1977: 548). Unfortunately, homosexuals as persons 
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fall into the gap between individual and society because, according to 
Horkheimer and Adorno, the concept that governs the possibility of 
their self-identification belongs to neither, but only to the dialectical 
detritus of enlightened domination. Their blind spots, however, can 
help to illuminate the possibility of – and the importance of their con-
tribution to – the ongoing process of the critical reconstruction of soci-
ety. 
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